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THE MAURITIUS ROUTE: THE INDIAN RESPONSE 
ASHRITA PRASAD KOTHA* 
INTRODUCTION 
India has a wide network of double taxation avoidance agreements, of which 
the most famous, or infamous, is the one with Mauritius. India’s tax treaty with 
Mauritius (“Treaty”) was signed at Port Louis on August 24, 1982 and has been 
effective since April 1, 1983 and July 1, 1983, in India and Mauritius, 
respectively.1 The Treaty was amended pursuant to a protocol (“Protocol”) 
signed on May 10, 2016.2 
The Preamble of the Treaty provides that one of its objectives is to 
encourage “mutual trade and investment.”3 The Treaty has served as the 
backbone for a major part of the foreign direct investment (“FDI”)4 into India. 
To be more precise, in 1993 the FDI inflow from Mauritius was estimated at 
 
* I would like to thank Karthik Ranganathan and Sriram Govind for taking time out to discuss some 
of the issues. I would like to thank Aishwarya Gupta, Asmita Singhvi, Paridhi Poddar, and V. Balaji 
for their valuable research assistance. Any errors are only mine. 
 1. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes of Income and Capital Gains art. 28, India-Mauritius, Aug. 24, 1982, 
Notification No. G.S.R. 920(E) (June, 12, 1983) [hereinafter I-M Treaty] (available for download 
at http://www.aseanbriefing.com/userfiles/resources-pdfs/India/DTA/Asia_DTA_Mauritius_ 
India.pdf). 
 2. Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, India-Mauritius, 
May 10, 2016, Notification No. S.O. 2680(E) (Aug. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Protocol], http://www.in 
cometaxindia.gov.in/communications/notification/notification682016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QKJ7-
SN58]. 
 3. I-M Treaty, supra note 1, at pmbl. This language is missing in some other treaties such as 
the tax treaty between India and UAE, which outlines its purposes as being “for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital.” 
See Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, India-U.A.E., Nov. 18, 1993, Notification No. G.S.R. 
710(E) (Nov. 18, 1993). 
 4. The Indian government categorizes inward foreign investment into different classes: 
foreign direct investment and foreign institutional investment. Investors opting for the former are 
considered to create a “lasting interest” in nonresident enterprises whereas the latter typically make 
short-term investments in the secondary capital markets. See DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY & 
PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., CONSOLIDATED FDI POLICY CIRCULAR OF 
2016, at 4 (2016) (India). 
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37.5 million Indian Rupees (“INR”), which grew phenomenally to 30,933 
million INR by 2000.5 FDI inflows for the period between April 2000 and 
September 2016 reveal that Mauritius has been the largest contributor of FDI, 
accounting for 5,194,995 million INR, representing 32.81% of the total inflows 
into India.6 The Supreme Court of India (“SC”) remarked in 2012 that the 
investment from Foreign Institutional Investors (“FII”) was about 4,500,000 
million INR, 700,000 million INR of which was from Mauritius.7 The trading 
relationship is somewhat reciprocal as India has been the largest exporter of 
goods and services to Mauritius since 2007,8 and the International Monetary 
Fund noted in 2013 that the end of the Treaty would have significant 
ramifications for the economy of Mauritius.9  
So, how did this come about? India opened its doors to foreign investment 
only in 1991, which was when Mauritius was emerging as a non-banking 
offshore jurisdiction.10 In this phase of simultaneous liberalisation, investors 
appear to have discovered the tax arbitrage opportunities available under the 
Treaty.11 The critical tax arbitrage opportunity related to capital gains arising 
from sale of shares contained in Article 13(4).12 
Article 13(4) is couched as a residuary provision. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of 
Article 13 discuss the allocation of taxation rights on gains from alienation of 
immovable property, movable property forming part of a permanent 
establishment/fixed base, and ships and aircrafts operating in international 
traffic and related movable property, respectively.13 Unlike paragraphs 1, 2, and 
3, paragraph 4 does not account for situs as a factor.14 Article 13(4) allocates 
gains derived by a resident from alienation of the remaining properties (other 
 
 5. THIRTEENTH LOK SABHA, 1 JOINT COMMITTEE ON STOCK MARKET SCAM AND MATTERS 
RELATING THERETO 299 (2002) (India) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON STOCK MARKET]. 
 6. DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUS., GOV’T OF 
INDIA, QUARTERLY FACT SHEET ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) FROM APRIL, 2000 TO 
SEPTEMBER, 2016, at 5 (2016) http://dipp.nic.in/sites/default/files/FDI_FactSheet_April_Sep_ 
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T5R-KHCC]. 
 7. Vodafone Int’l Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613, 729 (India). 
 8. MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, INDIA – MAURITIUS RELATIONS 3 (2016) (India), 
https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Mauritius_08_01_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ 
R3-FL8L]. 
 9. IMF, Mauritius: Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 13/97, at 8, 28 (Apr. 2013). 
 10. Suzanne Gujadhur Bell, The India Mauritius Special Relationship, OFFSHORE 
INVESTMENT, Jan. 2005, at 24, 24. 
 11. Urmila Barnymandhub Boolell, Indo-Mauritius Doubts Dispelled, INT’L TAX REV., Nov. 
1996, at 26, 26. 
 12. Prabu Natarajan, India Budget Outlines Incentives, INT’L TAX REV., Apr. 1997, at 9, 9 
(“Mauritius residents do not pay any capital gains tax in India on the disposition of shares of Indian 
companies.”). 
 13. I-M Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 13(1)–(3). 
 14. Serco BPO Private Ltd. v. Auth. for Advance Rulings, (2015) Civil Writ Petition No. 
11037 of 2014, ¶ 46 (Punjab and Haryana HC) (on file with author). 
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than those mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3) to the resident jurisdiction.15 
Paragraph 5 defines the concept of alienation.16 
Pursuant to Article 13(4), only the resident jurisdiction taxes capital gains 
from alienation of shares.17 In respect of the foreign investment coming into 
India from Mauritius, any capital gains on the alienation of shares was taxable 
only in Mauritius. The domestic tax law of Mauritius exempted capital gains 
from the sale of shares.18 Hence, gains from the alienation of shares held by 
Mauritius entities in Indian companies were not taxed in either India or 
Mauritius. This led to the migration of a number of entities to Mauritius, as is 
evidence by the FDI figures, and the emergence of the so-called Mauritius 
Route. 
The Mauritian authors have argued that the factors which led to the 
prominence of the Mauritius Route were not those under the Treaty, but those 
offered by Mauritius, such as superior service standards, labour workforce, 
proximity to India, historic and cultural ties,19 political stability, legal checks 
against expropriation, and a lack of foreign exchange constraints.20  
Considering that the double non-taxation opportunity under Article 13(4) of 
the Treaty has played a role with respect to the inflow of foreign investment,21 
this Paper looks at the Mauritius Route as a case study for understanding the link 
between taxation and migration. The modest attempt of this Paper is to examine 
the Indian tax law response to the migration of entities to Mauritius by assessing 
the role of the major actors—the executive, legislative, judicial and quasi-
judicial authorities, the tax authorities, and the revenue officers—between 1983 
and April 2017.  
 
 15. I-M Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 13(4). “Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State 
from the alienation of any property other than those mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this 
Article shall be taxable only in that State.” Id. 
 16. Id. at art. 13(5). 
 17. Id. at art. 13(4). 
 18. The Income Tax Act of 1995 exempts “[g]ains or profits derived from the sale of units or 
of securities [quoted on the Official List or on such Stock Exchanges or other exchanges and capital 
markets as may be approved by the Minister].” The Income Tax Act, 1995, part IV, ¶ 1 (Mauritius). 
 19. Bell, supra note 10, at 25. 
 20. Urmila Barnymandhub Boolell, Mauritius Offers Access to India, INT’L TAX REV., Mar. 
1996, at 47, 47. 
 21. See Vodafone Int’l Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613, 729 (India) 
(showing that in 2012, the investment in India from FII was about 4,500,000 million INR, 700,000 
million INR of which was from Mauritius). Despite academics not having reached a consensus on 
whether tax treaties lead to increased FDI, it is worth noting that the SC firmly believes that India 
received increased FDI and FII as a result of the Mauritius Route and not directly from investors 
based in Mauritius. For an overview of the different studies and views on the issue, see VERONIKA 
DAURER, 44 TAX TREATIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION 42–47 (2013). 
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I.  THE MAURITIUS ROUTE: ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE, CBDT, AND 
LEGISLATURE FROM 1983 TO 2016 
The Mauritius Route sparked the ire of the Indian revenue officers, as the 
entities availing the benefits of Article 13(4) were not beneficially owned from 
Mauritius. In response, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (“CBDT”) wrote to 
the Mauritius government claiming that such entities should be taxed in India.22 
The Mauritius authorities responded that though the beneficiaries of the funds 
investing into India were residents of third countries, the investments were made 
in the Indian capital markets in conformity with prevalent norms and 
regulations.23 The authorities also highlighted that the investments would not 
have been made in a risky jurisdiction such as India but for the Treaty.24  
The CBDT issued a circular (“Circular 1”) shortly thereafter, in March 1994. 
Circular 1 affirmed that as per Article 13(4), capital gains from alienation of 
shares arising in the hands of Mauritius residents would only be taxed according 
to the domestic law of Mauritius.25 Circular 1, which is a reiteration of the 
language of Article 13(4), appears to have been issued to reassure investors and 
the Mauritius government, alike.  
Pursuant to further talks, a joint working group was constituted in 1995 to 
renegotiate the Treaty.26 The Indian delegation proposed the insertion of a 
limitation clause,27 which was rejected by Mauritius.28 
 
 22. JOINT COMM. ON STOCK MARKET, supra note 5, at 300. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (explaining how India has a higher cost of investment due to its “high risk” investment 
market). 
 25. CBDT Circular No. 682, Clarification Regarding Agreement for Avoidance of Double 
Taxation with Mauritius (Mar. 30, 1994) (India), http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Communica 
tions/Circular/910110000000000444.htm [https://perma.cc/KAN6-Q882]. 
  3. Paragraph 4 deals with taxation of capital gains arising from the alienation of any 
property other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs and gives the right of 
taxation of capital gains only to that State of which the person deriving the capital gains is 
a resident. In terms of paragraph 4, capital gains derived by a resident of Mauritius by 
alienation of shares of companies shall be taxable only in Mauritius according to Mauritius 
tax law. Therefore, any resident of Mauritius deriving income from alienation of shares of 
Indian companies will be liable to capital gains tax only in Mauritius as per Mauritius tax 
law and will not have any capital gains tax liability in India. 
Id. 
 26. JOINT COMM. ON STOCK MARKET, supra note 5, at 301–02. 
 27. If, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, the right of India to tax income 
is limited and according to Mauritius tax laws the income is regarded as income from 
foreign sources and therefore exempted from Mauritius tax, India may tax such income as 
if this Agreement did not exist. 
Id. at 184. 
 28. Id. at 185. 
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In 2000, the revenue officers denied the benefit of Article 13(4) of the Treaty 
to some FIIs who were beneficially owned outside India and Mauritius.29 This 
resulted in the exit of some FIIs.30 The CBDT issued a circular (“Circular 2”) in 
April 2000. Circular 2 stated that FIIs and other investment funds operating from 
Mauritius are incorporated there and thus liable to tax there.31 Such entities are 
residents of Mauritius; once they have a residence certificate (“TRC”) issued by 
the Mauritian authorities, that would constitute sufficient proof for 
demonstrating, (i) beneficial ownership and residence for the concessional rate 
for dividend income under Article 10 and (ii) residence for capital gains under 
Article 13(4).32  
By stating that a TRC would be sufficient proof, any further enquiry by the 
revenue officers about the Mauritian entity including its beneficial 
ownership/control was sought to be shut out. Thus, there was no longer any 
silence in the law; Circular 2 clarified that beneficial ownership was irrelevant, 
thereby legalizing and legitimizing behaviour which may have hitherto been 
labelled as tax avoidance. 
In the early 2000s, there was a massive stock market scam in India.33 A Joint 
Parliamentary Committee, set up to investigate the scam, cautioned against the 
misuse of the Mauritius Route.34 However, it noted that the Indian government 
had made consistent efforts to renegotiate the Treaty.35 Failure to renegotiate 
 
 29. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 10 SCC 1, 19 (India). 
 30. Id. 
 31. CBDT Circular No. 789, Clarification Regarding Taxation of Income from Dividends and 
Capital Gains Under the Indo-Mauritius Double Tax Avoidance Convention (DTAC) (Apr. 13, 
2000) (India), http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Communications/Circular/9101100000000004 
83.htm [https://perma.cc/49P5-ZMH3]. 
 32. Id. (emphasis added). 
  1. The provisions of the Indo-Mauritius DTAC of 1983 apply to ‘residents’ of both 
India and Mauritius. Article 4 of the DTAC defines a resident of one State to mean “any 
person who, under the laws of that State is liable to taxation therein by reason of his 
domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature.” 
Foreign Institutional Investors and other investment funds, etc., which are operating from 
Mauritius are invariably incorporated in that country. These entities are ‘liable to tax’ under 
the Mauritius Tax law and are, therefore, to be considered as residents of Mauritius in 
accordance with the DTAC. 
  2. . . . It is hereby clarified that wherever a Certificate of Residence is issued by the 
Mauritian Authorities, such Certificate will constitute sufficient evidence for accepting the 
status of residence as well as beneficial ownership for applying the DTAC accordingly. 
  3. The test of residence mentioned above would also apply in respect of income from 
capital gains on sale of shares. Accordingly, FIIs, etc., which are resident in Mauritius 
would not be taxable in India on income from capital gains arising in India on sale of shares 
as per paragraph 4 of article 13. 
Id. 
 33. JOINT COMM. ON STOCK MARKET, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 34. Id. at 181. 
 35. Id. at 182–84. 
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was attributed to the “special relationship”36 shared with Mauritius, and the fact 
that Mauritius could not be singled out because similar provisions existed in 
treaties with other countries signed by India.37 
In 2008, the Indian government proposed moving from a residence to a 
source-based jurisdiction for Article 13(4).38 The Mauritian counterparts 
refused.39 In 2012, the Indian government announced the introduction of a 
General Anti-Avoidance Rule (“GAAR”), to be effective in assessment year 
2013-2014.40 This was later deferred,41 which may have nudged Mauritius to 
cooperate in subsequent negotiations.42 In 2013, Mauritius was willing to submit 
to a limitation of benefit clause but insisted on keeping Article 13(4) intact.43 
This did not find favour with the Indian government.  
There was an attempt to amend the Income-Tax Act of 1961 (“Act”) through 
the Finance Bill of 2013 to stipulate that a TRC was necessary but not sufficient 
proof for claiming benefits under a treaty.44 However, an uproar from the market 
led the then Finance Minister to issue a clarification that the proposed 
 
 36. Id. at 308. While the report does not elaborate on the special relationship, the two countries 
share historic and cultural ties apart from their trade and investment ties. See FED. RESEARCH DIV., 
LIBRARY OF CONG., INDIAN OCEAN: FIVE ISLAND COUNTRIES 100–02, 133–34 (Helen Chapin 
Metz ed., 3rd ed. 1995); Bell, supra note 10, at 24–25 (emphasis added). 
 37. JOINT COMM. ON STOCK MARKET, supra note 5, at 308. 
 38. India and Mauritius Fall Out over Double Tax Treaty, INT’L TAX REV. (Mar. 18, 2008), 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/2613987/India-and-Mauritius-fall-out-over-dou 
ble-tax-treaty.html [https://perma.cc/2Q9Y-NYCV]. 
 39. See id. Although Mauritius did not consent to the Indian government’s proposal, it “offered 
to concede ground by allowing the Indian tax authority to conduct direct tax investigations in the 
jurisdiction.” Id. 
 40. Presentation of Union Budget for 2012-13 Before the Joint Sitting of the Lok Sabha and 
the Rajya Sabha, ¶ 154 (Mar. 16, 2012) (India) (statement of Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of 
Finance), http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2012-13/bs/bs.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QK2-49PX]; 
Memorandum on the Indian Finance Bill, 2012, at 28–29 (Apr. 1, 2012), http://indiabudget.nic.in/ 
ub2012-13/mem/mem1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M22-KPKV]. 
 41. Pranab Amends GAAR Proposals: Here Are the Key Takeaways, BUS. TODAY (May 7, 
2012) (India), http://www.businesstoday.in/current/policy/gaar-pranab-mukherjee-amends-rules-
investment-avoid-tax/story/24635.html [https://perma.cc/PJ4E-L9RD]. 
 42. See Matthew Gilleard, Mauritius Finally Agrees to Rework Tax Treaty with India, INT’L 
TAX REV. (July 10, 2012), http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3058443/Mauritius-
finally-agrees-to-rework-tax-treaty-with-India.html [https://perma.cc/WV8N-UCWS]. 
 43. Matthew Gilleard, Mauritius Still Keen to Act on India Treaty and Change Image, INT’L 
TAX REV. (July 9, 2013), http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3229016/Mauritius-still-
keen-to-act-on-India-treaty-and-change-image.html [https://perma.cc/8ART-NTXE]. 
 44. The Finance Bill, 2013, Bill No. 18, Lok Sabha, Feb. 28, 2013, § 21 (India) (proposing 
amendment to § 90 of the Income-Tax Act) (“The certificate of being a resident in a country outside 
India or specified territory outside India, as the case may be, referred to in sub-section (4), shall be 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for claiming any relief under the agreement referred to 
therein.”). 
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amendment would not affect the Mauritius Route.45 Eventually, the provision 
never saw the light of the day. 
It is apparent now that the intention of the CBDT and the executive was to 
claim the right to tax. However, backlash from Mauritian authorities and internal 
hesitation in singling out Mauritius resulted in the Mauritius Route being closely 
guarded. The legislative amendments were also stalled because of market 
pressure.  
II.  TREATMENT OF THE MAURITIUS ROUTE BY THE INDIAN JUDICIAL AND 
QUASI-JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES: 1983 TILL NOW 
This Part looks at how the Indian judicial and quasi-judicial authorities dealt 
with the Mauritius Route, by analysing some key judgments and rulings.  
As the Mauritius Route began to be used only in the early 1990s, the 
litigation started shortly thereafter. The Mauritius Route came under the scrutiny 
of the judicial as well as quasi-judicial authorities. The earliest rulings came 
from the Authority for Advanced Rulings (“AAR”),46 a quasi-judicial authority 
set up to answer queries relating to the tax liability of nonresidents. Notably, the 
AAR could refuse an application if the transaction or issue was designed prima 
facie for tax avoidance.47 
A. Mauritius Route: The Early AAR Decisions 
In re Advance Ruling No. P. 9 of 199548 was one of the first queries posed 
on the Mauritius Route. It pertained to two Mauritian companies seeking to 
ascertain whether they could avail themselves of the benefits provided under 
Articles 10 and 13(4), as and when they earned dividends and capital gains.49 
The AAR rejected the applications stating that the transaction was designed 
prima facie for tax avoidance, as the beneficial owner was located in the United 
Kingdom.50 Had the beneficial owner invested directly into India, it would have 
 
 45. Press Release, Press Info. Bureau, Finance Ministry Issues Clarification Regarding Tax 
Residency Certificate (TRC) (Mar. 1, 2013) (India) (on file with author). 
 46. The AAR is a quasi-judicial authority that was set up under the Finance Act, 1993 to help 
non-residents assess their income tax liability and plan tax affairs well in advance. The tribunal 
comprises a Chairman (a retired Judge of the Supreme Court) and two members, one officer each 
from the Indian Revenue and Legal Services. A ruling given by the AAR binds the applicant and 
the tax authorities in respect of the specific transaction. See Finance Act, 1993, No. 38, Acts of 
Parliament, 1993, § 31 (India) (adding §§ 245N–245V, which established the AAR, to the Income-
Tax Act of 1961); Income-Tax Act (as amended by Finance Act, 2008), 1961, No. 43, Acts of 
Parliament, 1961, §§ 245O, 245R, 245S (India). 
 47. Income-Tax Act, § 245 R(2)(c). 
 48. (1996) 220 ITR 377 (A.A.R. decided Dec. 22, 1995). 
 49. Id. at 379–80, 382. 
 50. Id. at 390. 
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paid tax on capital gains both in India and the U.K. under the India-U.K. treaty, 
unlike under Article 13(4) of the Treaty.51 
In In re Advance Ruling P. No. 10 of 1996,52 an American company was 
setting up a fund, one tranche of which was to invest in India, for which an 
investment company and an investment manager were incorporated in 
Mauritius.53 Despite the applicant’s admission of the tax advantage, the AAR 
brushed it aside.54 The AAR felt the strongest point in favour of the applicant 
was that investments could not be made directly by multiple investors on account 
of the restrictions in the Indian law.55 The AAR also accepted the reasoning that 
the companies were incorporated in Mauritius because it was a low-cost 
financial services centre.56  
This ruling was hailed as pragmatic because the transaction was considered 
to be based on strong commercial reasons.57 It is worth noting that both orders 
were given by the same Chairman because the difference in approach is quite 
stark; in the former order, the AAR’s impression of a tax arbitrage motive was 
sufficient to make out a case for tax avoidance while in the latter that seemed 
less relevant. While there were convincing reasons to show that there was a need 
to invest through a single entity, the choice of Mauritius was justified merely on 
objective factors. In later applications as well, the question relating to tax 
avoidance was tackled on similar lines.58  
The same Chairman made an additional point in TVM Ltd. v Commissioner 
of Income-Tax; the eligibility of the applicant to enjoy relief under the Treaty is 
contingent on having paid taxes in Mauritius.59  
B. Legality of Circular 2 
This and other circumstances outlined in the earlier section may have 
prompted issuance of Circular 2. The next set of landmark cases surrounded the 
legality of Circular 2.  
In Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, the SC upheld the legal validity 
of Circular 2.60 Strictly speaking, Article 13(4) never required control or 
 
 51. Id. at 391. 
 52. (1996) 224 ITR 473 (A.A.R. decided Aug. 14, 1996). 
 53. Id. at 482–83. 
 54. Id. at 507. “[O]ne would certainly be too naive if one were to believe that self interest and 
tax considerations did not enter the picture.” Id. at 508. 
 55. Id. at 510. 
 56. Id. at 507. 
 57. Roy Rohatgi, Authority Aids India’s Global Image, INT’L TAX REV., June 1997, at 35, 39. 
 58. TVM Ltd. v. Comm’r of Income-Tax (1997) 237 ITR 230, 247–48 (A.A.R. Mar. 18, 
1997); DLJMB Mauritius Investment Co. v. Comm’r of Income-Tax, (1997) 228 ITR 268, 277 
(A.A.R. July 16, 1997). 
 59. See (1997) 237 ITR 230, 249 (A.A.R.). 
 60. (2003) 10 SCC 1, 64 (India). 
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beneficial ownership of the shares to be within India or Mauritius. Thus, the 
officers used the analysis of TVM Ltd. v Commissioner of Income-Tax,61 and 
they argued that as the entities were not paying taxes in Mauritius they were 
nonresidents and thus disentitled from availing the Treaty.62 The SC held that 
the Union Government is empowered to issue circulars for implementation of a 
treaty, and such circulars would prevail over the domestic law in case of any 
inconsistency.63 The SC remarked that for all the fury of the revenue officers, 
treaty shopping and abuse “may have been intended.”64 If the benefits of the 
Treaty were to be denied to nationals of a third State, a limitation of benefits 
clause should have been included. The judges reasoned that treaties are 
negotiated with various factors in mind and represent a set of compromises, and 
developing countries often permit treaty shopping to incentivize “scarce foreign 
capital or technology.”65 
C. Application of Azadi Bachao 
Azadi Bachao only laid down the law and thus, it is germane to examine 
how this was applied in subsequent precedents. 
In In re Dynamic India Fund I,66 despite the applicant’s Mauritius TRC, the 
revenue officers argued for denial of benefits under Article 13(4) on account of 
the entity being controlled from India.67 The AAR observed that there was no 
evidence to prove that the control was exercised from India, and on account of 
the TRC, Article 13(4) benefit was available.68  
However, in a later application, the AAR observed that the revenue officers 
failed to rebut the presumption of tax residency created by the TRC.69 Thus, it 
appeared that TRC was no longer considered as conclusive proof of tax 
residency. 
 
 61. TVM Ltd., (1997) 237 ITR at 249. 
 62. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 10 SCC at 38. 
 63. Id. at 27. But cf., Income-Tax Act (as amended by Finance Act, 2008), 1961, No. 43, Acts 
of Parliament, 1961, § 90(2) (India) (establishing that, when a nonresident whose home country 
has a tax agreement with India, the provisions of the 1961 Act apply “to the extent they are more 
beneficial”). 
 64. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 10 SCC at 54 (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. at 53–54. 
 66. A.A.R. No. 1016 of 2010 (July 18, 2012), http://aarrulings.in/it-rulings/uploads/pdf/1342 
683890_dynamic.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL7A-GSGD]. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12. 
 69. In re SmithKline Beecham Port Louis Ltd., A.A.R. No. 1004 of 2010, ¶¶ 8, 9 (Aug. 16, 
2012), http://aarrulings.in/it-rulings/uploads/pdf/1345628438_aar-1004-smithkline.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/K8NN-HHPR]; see e.g., Aayush Kumar & Varun Natarajan, Indo-Mauritius DTAA: The 
Way Forward, 41 INTERTAX 693, 694–95 (2013); Mihir Naniwadekar, Recent AAR Rulings on 
the ‘Mauritius Route,’ INDIACORPLAW (Aug. 23, 2012), http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.in/2012/08/ 
recent-aar-rulings-on-mauritius-route.html [https://perma.cc/8APH-Z2EJ]. 
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In E*Trade Mauritius Ltd. v. DIT International Taxation, the AAR held that 
the TRC would at least constitute presumptive evidence of beneficial ownership 
of shares and gains therefrom, even if not conclusive evidence. 70 The AAR 
observed that the double non-taxation under the Treaty was odd, and had been 
inevitable because of the peculiar provision in the Treaty, the CBDT circular, 
and the law laid down in Azadi Bachao.71 Even while doubting the logic of using 
TRC to infer beneficial ownership, the AAR opined that the presumption created 
by the TRC had not been rebutted on facts.72 The revenue authorities appealed 
this decision, putting issues of beneficial ownership back on the table.73  
The Bombay High Court in Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. v. Deputy Director of 
Income Tax distinguished Azadi Bachao because, there, the investing entity was 
U.S.-owned—not Mauritius.74 The TRC from the Mauritius authorities was 
thus, irrelevant. 
Hence, within a decade of the Azadi Bachao ruling, the ratio had been 
distinguished, followed, and narrowed down. 75 Revenue officers continued to 
seek denial of Article 13(4) by urging issues of beneficial ownership and control. 
This occasioned the SC to reaffirm the validity of the Mauritius Route in 
Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India.76 The Court reiterates 
the inextricable link between the Mauritius Route and foreign investment, as can 
be seen from the following quote: 
No presumption can be drawn that the Union of India or the Tax Department is 
unaware that the quantum of both FDI and FII do not originate from Mauritius 
but from other global investors situate outside Mauritius. . . . If the Union of 
India and Tax Department insist that the investment would directly come from 
Mauritius and Mauritius alone then the Indo-Mauritius treaty would be dead 
letter.77 
 
 70. A.A.R. No. 826 of 2009, ¶ 10 (March 22, 2010), http://aarrulings.in/it-rulings/uploads/pdf 
/1269340941_etrade.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD5C-5U3Q]. 
 71. Id. ¶ 14. 
 72. See id. ¶¶ 6.5, 10, 12, 14. The applicant was a Mauritian company and its holding company 
was in the United States. Id. ¶ 1.1. Though the parent company had funded the share purchase, 
played a key role in negotiating the share sale, and was the end recipient of the sale consideration, 
it was held that the evidence did not rebut the presumption created by the TRC. Id. ¶ 12. 
 73. M. Padmakshan, Taxman Moves High Court Against Authority for Advance Ruling’s 
Order on E*Trade Mauritius, ECON. TIMES, (Aug. 9, 2013) (India), http://economictimes.india 
times.com/news/economy/policy/taxman-moves-high-court-against-authority-for-advance-rul 
ings-order-on-etrade-mauritius/articleshow/21718530.cms [https://perma.cc/WMV4-CGMA]. 
 74. (2012) 342 ITR 308, ¶¶ 4–19, 46–47 (2011) (Bombay HC). 
 75. See In re Ardex Investments Mauritius Ltd. No. 886 of 2010, ¶ 6 (A.A.R. Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://aarrulings.in/it-rulings/uploads/pdf/1321368205_ruling-ardex.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE43-
GTKL]. 
 76. (2012) 6 SCC 613, 727 (India). 
 77. Id. (emphasis added in part). 
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The SC clarified that while a limitation of benefit cannot be read into a tax 
treaty, a TRC may be assailed in case of a colorable device, tax fraud, or when 
a resident uses an entity for round tripping or any other illegal activities.78 
In Serco BPO Private Ltd. v. Authority for Advance Rulings,79 the High 
Court of Punjab and Haryana said that refusal to accept the validity of a TRC 
would be contrary to the Treaty and “constitute an erosion of the faith and trust” 
between States.80 If the entitlement to benefits under the Treaty was subject to 
actual payment of taxes in Mauritius, it would result in an unintended fluid and 
fluctuating position.81 TRC was also upheld by the AAR in In re Shinesei I 
Investment Ltd.82 
A perusal of the rulings and precedents reveals that the Mauritius Route has 
been subject to much litigation over the years. The AAR’s first set of rulings 
were faced with the difficult task of deciding the legality and legitimacy of the 
Mauritius Route; albeit prima facie. As has been pointed out, even before 
Circular 2 was issued, there was a change in the AAR’s approach in tackling 
issues of perceived tax avoidance. The SC’s validation of Circular 2 and the 
Mauritius Route did not prevent some AAR rulings to depart from a seemingly 
settled position. The SC’s upholding of Circular 2 and the Mauritius Route, 
while based on the reluctance to rewrite a treaty, openly acknowledges the non-
tax factors that play out in treaty negotiations.  
III.  THE PROTOCOL: UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE AND IMPACT 
The Protocol was signed between India and Mauritius on May 10, 2016.83 
It amended a few articles of the Treaty, including Article 13.84 The analysis here 
only examines the amendments relating to capital gains taxation arising from 
alienation of shares.  
The Treaty has been amended to incorporate two new paragraphs in Article 
13. In effect, the right to tax capital gains from alienation of shares acquired on 
or after April 1, 2017 is vested with the source jurisdiction.85 Capital gains on 
shares acquired on or after April 1, 2017 and derived between then and March 
31, 2019 may avail the benefit of a concessional rate—50% of the tax rate 
 
 78. Id. at 728–29. 
 79. (2015) Civil Writ Petition No. 11307 of 2014 (Punjab and Haryana HC) (on file with 
author). 
 80. Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. ¶ 40. 
 82. A.A.R. No. 1017 of 2010, ¶ 7 (Aug. 10, 2016), http://aarrulings.in/it-rulings/uploads/pdf/ 
1473270870_aar-1017-shinsei-ruling.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PBR-SMYS]. 
 83. Protocol, supra note 2. 
 84. Id. at art. 4 (amending Article 13 of the I-M Treaty). 
 85. Id. (inserting paragraph (3A) into Article 13: “Gains from the alienation of shares acquired 
on or after 1st April 2017 in a company which is resident of a Contracting State may be taxed in 
that State.”). 
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prevalent in the source state86—on the fulfilment of conditions stipulated in a 
limitation of benefit clause set out in Article 27A (“LOB”), as explained later. 
Article 13(4) still leaves taxing rights of any property, other than that mentioned 
in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 3A, with the residence state.87 
A. Analysing the Protocol and the LOB 
The Protocol confines itself to shares, continuing the trend of Circular 1 and 
Circular 2. “Shares” is not defined in the Treaty. Article 10(4) defines dividends 
as income from shares or other rights, and juxtaposes it from debt-claims, 
participating in profits, and other corporate rights subject to same tax treatment 
as shares.88 The meaning attributed to shares would thus depend on the Indian 
domestic law, unless context suggests otherwise.89 The Companies Act of 2013 
defines a “share” as a share in the share capital, including stock.90 Hence, the 
Protocol does not disturb the allocation of taxing rights in respect of other fiscal 
instruments like debentures, hybrid instruments such as compulsory convertible 
debentures, futures and options contracts,91 alienation of interests in limited 
liability partnerships,92 and participatory notes.93 
It is germane to peruse the Indian domestic law on capital gains taxation 
with respect to shares to see if the issue of double non-taxation existing in the 
erstwhile regime has been resolved.  
 
 86. Id. (inserting paragraph (3B) into Article 13: “However, the tax rate on the gains referred 
to in paragraph 3A of this Article and arising during the period beginning on 1st April, 2017 and 
ending on 31st March, 2019 shall not exceed 50% of the tax rate applicable on such gains in the 
State of residence of the company whose shares are being alienated.”). 
 87. Id. (replacing the existing paragraph 4 of Article 13 with the following: “Gains from the 
alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 3A shall be taxable 
only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident.”). 
 88. I-M Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 10(4) (“The term ‘dividends’ as used in this Article means 
income from shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income 
from other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares 
by the laws of the Contracting State of which the company making the distribution is a resident.”). 
 89. Id. at art. 3(2) (“In the application of the provisions of this Convention by a Contracting 
State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires have the meaning 
which it has under the laws in force of that Contracting State relating to the areas which are the 
subject of this Convention.”). 
 90. Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 2(84) (India). 
 91. Linesh Lalwani, Ashish Sodhani & Rajesh Simhan, India Mauritius Tax Treaty 
Renegotiated, NISHITH DESAI ASSOCS.: TAX HOTLINE (May 11, 2016), http://www.nishithdesai. 
com/information/research-and-articles/nda-hotline/nda-hotline-single-view/article/india-over 
hauls-tax-treaty-with-mauritius-india-and-mauritius-sign-protocol-for-amendment-of-dtaa. 
html?no_cache=1&cHash=b4f74d914ce62cff5000a5029b488625 [https://perma.cc/3FE3-MR75]. 
 92. Dhruv Sanghavi, ‘Company’ and ‘Shares’ Under the 2016 India-Mauritius Protocol and 
the U.N. Model Treaty, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 509, 509 (2016). 
 93. Editorial, Mauritius No Longer India’s Treasure Island, ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 14, 
2016, at 8, 8 (India). 
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The Act draws a distinction between long-term and short-term gains.94 
Interestingly, India has liberalized its domestic regime on capital gains taxes on 
shares in the past decade.95 The Finance Act of 2004 introduced a Securities 
Transaction Tax (“STT”),96 which levies a 0.1% tax on the purchase and sale of 
equity shares on the purchaser and seller where inter alia the transaction is 
entered into on a recognised stock exchange.97 In turn, (a) long-term gains from 
sale of equity shares are exempt from tax if the transfer was effected after 
October 1, 2004 and STT had been paid thereon,98 and (b) short-term gains from 
sale of equity shares are taxed at a flat rate of 15% if the transfer was effected 
after October 1, 2004 and STT had been paid.99  
Hence, despite the reallocation of taxing rights transactions, long-term 
capital gains from listed equity shares will still enjoy a double non-taxation 
status. The Final Report on BEPS Action Plan 6 on the issue of treaty abuse 
seeks to clarify that tax treaties are not intended to create opportunities for 
double non-taxation.100 Will the revenue officers continue to raise issues of 
abuse on account of the limited double non-taxation?  
The LOB is not a treaty-wide clause, being restricted solely to capital gains, 
and will only be in force for two years. The conditions contained in the LOB 
state that the entity should not be (a) arranged with the primary purpose of taking 
advantage of the particular provision or (b) a shell /conduit company.101 An 
entity fulfilling the former criterion appears to also satisfy the bona fide business 
activities test. A shell/conduit company is defined as an entity “with negligible 
or nil business operations or with no real and continuous business activities 
carried out in [the] Contracting State.”102 An entity is deemed to be not a 
“shell/conduit company” if (a) in the immediately preceding twelve month 
period its expenditure on operations is equal or more than 2.7 million INR or (b) 
 
 94. See Income-Tax Act (as amended by Finance Act, 2008), 1961, No. 43, Acts of 
Parliament, 1961, §§ 2(29A), 2(29B), 2(42A), 2(42B) (India). A capital asset is ordinarily termed 
to be long-term if it has been held for a period of at least thirty-six months prior to transfer. See id. 
at § 2(42A) (defining a “short-term capital asset” as a capital asset held for not more than thirty-six 
months). However, this period is modified to twelve months in the instance of listed shares and 
twenty-four months in the instance of unlisted equity shares. Id. 
 95. Prashant Prakash, Jaya Kumari Pandey & Abhishek K. Chintu, Revisiting Capital Gains 
Tax on Securities in India, ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 14, 2016, at 47, 47. 
 96. Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, No. 23, Acts of Parliament, 2004, §§ 97(13), 98, 99(c) (India). 
 97. Id. § 98. 
 98. Income-Tax Act, § 10(38). 
 99. Id. § 111A. 
 100. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND 
PROFIT SHARING PROJECT: PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6 – 2015 FINAL REPORT, at 91–93 (2015). 
 101. Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 8 (adding Article 27A into the I-M Treaty). 
 102. Id. 
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the entity is listed on a recognised stock exchange in one of the Contracting 
States.103 
In the event that the beneficial ownership of a Mauritian entity is not held in 
Mauritius, the revenue officers may argue that the primary purpose is to gain tax 
arbitrage, and thus seek disallowance of the concessional rate. Taking cue from 
past decisions, companies will have to demonstrate strong commercial reasons 
to tip the balance in their favour. Coming to the shell/conduit company test, 
which is a mix of objective and subjective factors, companies may attempt to 
meet the former (expenditure threshold or listing requirement) to avoid further 
scrutiny. How fool proof is the test then? 
The language and tests in the LOB is reminiscent of a limitation clause that 
was incorporated in the India-Singapore tax treaty in 2005. In 2005, the India-
Singapore tax treaty was amended to assign the right to tax capital gains to the 
resident jurisdiction.104 However, companies had to fulfill conditions under a 
limitation clause.105 Hence, while the limitation clause in the India-Singapore 
treaty applied so that a company could claim to be taxed in the resident 
jurisdiction, the LOB conditions help a company to enjoy a concessional rate of 
taxation in the source state. Considering that the context and purpose of the two 
limitation clauses are different, one wonders if the language of the LOB was 
inspired from the limitation clause in the India-Singapore tax treaty and the 
propriety of the same.  
Significantly, this amendment was to be in force only until the Treaty 
provided for resident jurisdiction for capital gains on shares.106 Consequently, 
the India-Singapore tax treaty has now been amended.107  
B. Treaty and GAAR Interplay 
GAAR is coming into force with effect from April 1, 2017,108 which 
coincides with the commencement of the Protocol. GAAR targets impermissible 
avoidance arrangements.109 If a transaction is classified as impermissible, the 
arrangement may be disregarded, income may be re-characterized, and 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Protocol Amending the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Taxes on Income, India-Sing., art. 6, June 29, 2005, Notification 
No. S.O. 1022(E) (July 18, 2005). 
 105. Id. at art. 3. 
 106. Id. at art. 6. 
 107. Press Release, Press Info. Bureau, Ministry of Fin., India and Singapore Sign a Third 
Protocol for Amending the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) (Dec. 30, 2016) 
(India), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=156015 [https://perma.cc/3X4S-RVZ6]. 
 108. Income-Tax Act (as amended by Finance Act, 2008), 1961, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 
1961, § 95(2) (India). 
 109. Id. § 96(1). Described as arrangements, the main purpose of which, is to obtain a tax 
benefit and that: (a) are not on an arms-length basis; (b) result in misuse or abuse of the Act; (c) 
lack commercial substance; or (d) are not bona fide. Id. 
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transactions may be looked through, amongst other actions.110 How does this 
affect the Treaty and the Protocol? GAAR applies even if it is less beneficial to 
an “assessee,”111 thus operating as a unilateral treaty override. The effect of 
GAAR on the Treaty and the Protocol has to be understood in two phases: (i) 
April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2019 when the LOB will be in effect and (ii) April 
1, 2019 onwards when the LOB ceases to exist.  
In the first phase one has to examine whether LOB and GAAR would apply 
simultaneously. The CBDT has clarified that “[i]f a case of avoidance is 
sufficiently addressed by LOB in the treaty, there shall not be an occasion to 
invoke GAAR.”112 Technically, revenue officers may still claim that abuse is not 
“sufficiently addressed” through the LOB and that GAAR should apply as 
well.113 For example, in the case of capital gains on listed equity shares which 
still enjoy double non-exemption, revenue officers may invoke this window of 
opportunity. 
In the second phase, Article 13 along with remaining provisions of the 
Treaty would be subject to the greater scrutiny under GAAR. The CBDT has 
assured that GAAR will be invoked rarely and uniformly and not merely because 
a tax-neutral jurisdiction has been chosen.114 However, it is still early days to 
say how this would play out for the Mauritius Route.  
A significant move ahead in the domain of tax treaties is the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (“MLI”), which has been signed by India.115 Each signatory 
can choose which of its treaty partners is to be covered under the MLI.116 While 
India intended to bring the Treaty within the ambit of MLI,117 Mauritius has not 
 
 110. Id. § 98(1). 
 111. Id. § 90(2A). 
 112. CBDT Circular No.7 of 2017, Clarifications on Implementation of GAAR Provisions 
Under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Jan. 27, 2017) (India) (emphasis added), http://www.incometax 
india.gov.in/communications/circular/circular7_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FCN-V7N5]. 
 113. Sriram Govind, New India GAAR Circular Aims for Clarity but Remains Unsatisfactory, 
MULTINATIONAL TAX & TRANSFER PRICING NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), http://mnetax.com/new-india-
gaar-circular-aims-clarity-remains-unsatisfactory-19320 [https://perma.cc/NF4F-7ZQ7]. 
 114. Press Release, CBDT, Dep’t of Rev., Ministry of Fin., Sub: Clarifications on 
Implementation of GAAR Provisions Under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Jan. 27, 2017) (India) (on 
file with author). 
 115. Sriram Govind, India’s Multilateral Instrument Choices: A Quick Run-Through, 
MULTINATIONAL TAX & TRANSFER PRICING NEWS (June 12, 2017), https://mnetax.com/indias-
multilateral-instrument-choices-quick-run-21718 [https://perma.cc/3NFA-6V8C]. 
 116. Id. 
 117. India: Status of List Reservations and Notifications at the Time of Signature, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-position-india.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6ZT-C8MQ] 
(showing India including the Treaty with Mauritius as part of the agreements to be covered by the 
MLI). 
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taken such position.118 Hence, the minimum standards set out in the MLI do not 
apply to the Treaty.  
CONCLUSION 
The Mauritius Route provides an interesting case study for a taxation and 
migration analysis. When the migration of entities to Mauritius for tax arbitrage 
opportunities was discovered, one may have anticipated that the Treaty would 
be amended to plug the loophole causing the double non-taxation opportunity. 
However, the Indian response demonstrates why this was not to be. At the heart 
of the Indian response is the belief of the SC, the Indian executive, and the CBDT 
that the Treaty has played a pivotal role for the Indian economy, trade, foreign 
investment, and bilateral relations. 
The Mauritius Route brought to the forefront the tussle between the revenue 
officers on the one hand, and the Indian executive and CBDT on the other hand. 
As has been highlighted, the executive and CBDT began their dialogue with an 
aim to claim the taxing rights but eventually changed their stance in the wake of 
the non-tax factors. 
Circular 2 of CBDT legalized and legitimized the Mauritius Route so much 
so that later, when there was a proposal to amend the Act regarding the 
sufficiency of the TRC, it could not be passed. Despite the Mauritius Route 
receiving affirmation from the highest court it has been the subject of much 
litigation perhaps because the revenue officers were not convinced of the 
legitimacy of Article 13(4).  
The Protocol has its own shortcomings and one has yet to see how the Indian 
experience will be shaped in light of the GAAR. In light of the developments 
relating to the MLI, if any changes are to be made to the Treaty it would only 
have to be through bilateral negotiations between India and Mauritius. Given 
how closely the bilateral relations have been guarded, this may mean a long wait 
before any further breakthrough. 
 
 
 
 118. Mauritius: Status of List Reservations and Notifications at the Time of Signature, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-position-mauritius.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YBS-4LF7] 
(showing Mauritius not including the Treaty with India as part of the agreements to be covered by 
the MLI). 
